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the unit. However, such confidential relationship between the spouses does
not offer sufficient excuse to exempt them from conviction if they are guilty
26
of the crime.
The Dege case resolves the conflict which had existed between the
circuits. It is submitted that the Court correctly took this opportunity to
overrule a doctrine "that has parrot-like been repeated ' 27 since the eighteenth
century. Whether the state courts will follow this rule remains to be seen.
MARVIN S. MALTZMAN

FEDERAL

PROCEDURE-JURISDICTION
BY STIPULATION

CONFERRED

The plaintiff, a citizen of Pennsylvania, brought a negligence action
against the defendant corporation, a citizen of New York, in a federal
district court in Pennsylvania. The defendant, by answer, challenged diversity
jurisdiction because it was also incorporated under the laws of Pennsylvania.
Subsequently, the parties stipulated to the jurisdiction of the court. After
twenty-three months, during which time extensive discovery and pre-trial
procedures were utilized and the statute of limitations had expired, the
defendant moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The motion was granted
and the plaintiff appealed. Held, reversed: the trial court abused its discretion
by re-examining jurisdictional facts previously stipulated to by the parties.
Di Frischia v. New York Cent. R.R., 279 F.2d 141 (3d Cir. 1960).
The great weight of authority holds that jurisdiction of a federal court
may not be conferred by agreement, consent or collusion of the parties.1
Diversity jurisdiction is a fact which must exist at the time the jurisdiction
of a federal court is invoked.2 If at any time jurisdiction is challenged, the
court is under a duty to proceed no further until the jurisdictional question

26. See Williams, The Legal Unity of Husband and Wife, 10 MODERN L. REV.

16 (1947).
27. United States v. Dege, 80 Sup. Ct. 1589, 1591 (1960).

1. United States v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 226 (1938); Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237
(1934); Ayers v. Watson, 113 U.S. 594 (1885); People's Bank v. Calhoun, 102 U.S.
256 (1880); Orth v. Transit Inv. Corp., 132 F.2d 938 (3d Cir. 1942); Page v. Wright,

116 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 710 (1941); 1 MOORE, FEDERAL
§ 0.60, at 608 (2d ed. 1960). "Diverse State citizenship of the parties, or some
other jurisdictional fact prescribed by the second section, is absolutely essential, and cannot
be waived, and the want of it will be error at any stage of the cause .....
Ayers
v. Watson, supra at 598.
2. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178 (1936); Birmingham
Post Co. v. Brown, 217 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1954); Town of Lantana v. Hopper,
103 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1939).
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is determined. 3 The parties may agree to the jurisdictional facts which sustain
or defeat jurisdiction, either by admission in the pleadings or stipulation. 4
The courts will generally accept the allegations of diverse citizenship without
formal proof.5 However, if the defendant challenges the diversity allegations,
either by motion or in his answer, the plaintiff must establish proof of
diversity jurisdiction.0 After the pleadings are closed the defendant may
raise the issue of diversity jurisdiction by suggestion, 7 either subsequent to
the answer but prior to trial, 8 during trial,9 or after trial but before appeal. 10
In the event the defendant fails to challenge diversity, the court is not
necessarily bound by the admissions or stipulations of the parties but may
raise the issue sua sponte and require the party alleging jurisdiction to
prove his allegations."
Several recent decisions have created an exception to the established
rule that the parties may suggest lack of jurisdiction at any time during the
proceedings.12 The exception becomes applicable when the trial court has
3
made a special inquiry into, and has ruled upon the jurisdictional facts.1
3. Page v. Wright, 116 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 710

(1941); 2

MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE §

12.23, at 2330, n.14 (2d ed. 1948).

4. Di Frischia v. New York Cent. R.R., 279 F.2d 141 (3d Cir. 1960); 1-larllec v.
City of Gulfport, 120 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1941).
5. Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 72 (1939); Republic Pictures Corp. v. Security-First
Nat'l Bank, 197 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1952).
6. See cases cited note 2 supra.
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 12 (h) provides "that, whenever it appears by suggestion
of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the

court shall dismiss the action."

8. Parmelee v. Ackerman, 252 F.2d 721 (6th Cir. 1958); Farr v. Detroit Trust Co.,
116 F.2d 807 (6th Cir. 1941).
9. Ambassador East, Inc. v. Orsatti, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 937 (E.D. Pa. 1957),
rev'd on other grounds, 257 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1958).
10. Lee Wing Hong v. Dulles, 214 F.2d 753 (7th Cir. 1954); Zank v. Landon, 205
F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1953).
11. Mansfield, C. & L. M. Ry. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379 (1884); Hackner v. Guaranty
Trust Co., 117 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1941).
12. A "suggestion" is neither a pleading nor a motion, and filing a "suggestion" does
not relieve a party from pleading or moving the court under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rank v. United States, 16 F.R.D. 310 (S.D. Cal. 1954). See note 7 sujpra.
13. Young v. Handwork, 179 F.2d 70 (7th Cir. 1949). The defendants filed a motion
to dismiss on several grounds, one of which was lack of diversity jurisdiction. The diversity
issue presented a question of fact as to the residence of the deceased at the time of
filing the petition for bankruptcy. The defendants filed an amended motion to dismiss,
but failed to raise the issue and in open court admitted the facts in the plaintiff's
complaint. Following determination by the court upon the merits, the defendants attempted
to raise the issue once more, but the court denied leave to file the amendment, which
action was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
In the case of Price v. Greenway, 167 F.2d 196 (3d Cir. 1948), the trial court made
a special inquiry into the jurisdictional facts when the defendant alleged that both parties
resided in the same state. After an examination of many complicated facts, the court
ruled that diverse citizenship did exist. A mistrial was declared later. At the second trial
the court refused to re-examine jurisdictional facts which had been judicially determined
in the prior proceedings. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the ruling
made by the trial court in the second action.
In the recent case of Klee v. Pittsburgh & W. Va. Ry., 22 F.R.D. 252 (W.D.
Pa. 1958), the defendant admitted diversity in his answer. Four days before the statute
of limitations would have run, the defendant moved to amend his answer to deny diversity.
The court denied the motion on the ground that the defendant was attempting to file
supplemental pleadings which the court may or may not permit according to the court's
discretion.
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In such cases the trial court must exercise its "discretion" to determine
whether it will re-examine the facts as set forth by the special hearing and
ruling. 14 The rationale for this exception is founded upon the general principle that a court will not relitigate issues once judicially determined unless
the parties are able to introduce new evidence. '5 The result of the application of this exception is in keeping with the intent of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure to determine speedily the rights of the litigants. 1
The court in the instant case adopted the recent trend of permitting
the trial court to exercise its discretion as to whether it will re-examine the
jurisdictional facts'once there has been a special inquiry to determine diversity
jurisdiction. The trial court did not in fact make a special inquiry into the
jurisdictional facts. However, the appellate court construed the stipulation
by the parties to have eliminated the necessity for a special hearing. The
effect of the stipulation was to amend the answer by striking the defense
and admit the jurisdictional facts alleged in the complaint. Thus, the trial
court's order as to jurisdiction was valid and binding on the parties. 1 7 The
parties, as a matter of right, could not subsequently raise a question as to
these jurisdictional facts. 18 However, the court could in its discretion re-examine the facts. 19 The Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused
its discretion by such a re-examination some twenty-three months later. The
court aptly pointed out that during this period the statute of limitations had
20
expired on the claim.
In the instant case one may question whether the trial court in its
original ruling had made a special inquiry into the jurisdictional facts, since
the court accepted only the stipulation of the parties. It would seem the
court made such a special inquiry for the first time when the issue was raised
at the pre-trial conference. However, the majority view among the federal
14. The discretion the trial court may use flows from the disputed interpretation of
the word "suggest" as used in Rule 12 (h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
majority view maintains there is no discretion to be exercised as there is an absolute right
to raise the defense at any time. United States v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 226 (1938); Page
v. Wright, 116 F,2d 449 (7th Cir. 1940). The minority view maintains there is no
absolute right unless there is strict compliance with Rule 12. Young v. Handwork, 179
F.2d 70 (7th Cir. 1949); Price v. Greenway, 167 F.2d 196 (3d Cir. 1948); Klee v. Pittsburgh & W. Va. Ry., 22 F.R.D. 252 (W.D. Pa. 1958); 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 12.23, at 2330, 2331, n.14 (2d ed. 1948).
15. See note 13 supra.
16. FED. R. Civ. P. 1: "These rules govern the procedure in the United States district
courts in all suits of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity, with the
exceptions stated in Rule 81. They shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action."
17. Di Frischia v. New York Cent. R.R., 279 F.2d 141, 144 (3d Cir. 1960).
18. See note 13 supra.
19. Hackner v. Guaranty Trust Co., 117 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1941) (jurisdictional
issues can be raised and the facts examined at any time by the court on its own motion).
20. The statute of limitations barred the plaintiff from bringing the action in a state
court of Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. tit. 12, § 31 (1936). However, the brief for the appellee
points out that the statute of limitations of the state where the cause of actioniaccrued
did not bar the action. Brief for Appellee, p. 10, Di Frischia v. New York Cent. R.R.,
279 F.2d 141 (3d Cir. 1960). See note 26 infra.
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courts is still adverse to this decision. 21 A party is not precluded from.raising
the diversity issue, either in the pleadings or otherwise, by any form of
laches, waiver or estoppel. 22 The minority position is well taken that there
should be some point at which undisputed jurisdictional facts will be settled.
However, when a party reasonably "suggests" to the court a lack of diversity,
23
the action must be dismissed as the federal court is without power to act.
The dicta in the instant case indicated that the appellate court may
make an inquiry into jurisdiction if the trial court has not made a determination of the jurisdictional facts. 24 A trial court may make additional
inquiries into jurisdiction if the parties can introduce evidence which was
not available at the time of pleading.25 The decision appears equitable,
since the statute of limitations on the claim had expired.2 6 However, it does
not appear to conform with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 2 7 nor with
the current trend to reduce the work load of the federal courts. It is
submitted that the result of the instant case is to give the trial judge
discretion, under these facts, as to whether he will dismiss a diversity
action, when in fact no such discretion formerly existed.
JOHN

B.

WHITE

FEDERAL COURTS-THE "SILVER PLATTER" DOCTRINE
The petitioners were convicted in a federal district court for intercepting
and divulging telephone communications in violation of the Communications Act of 1934.1 The evidence which led to their conviction had been
obtained originally by state officers with a search warrant issued "upon
information and belief" that one of the petitioners possessed obscene
21. America Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6 (1951); Mitchell v. Maurer, 293
U.S. 237 (1934); Hospoder v.United States, 209 F.2d 427 (3d Cir. 1953); Orth v.
Transit Inv. Corp., 132 F.2d 938 (3d Cir. 1942); Page v. Wright, 116 F.2d 449 (7th
Cit. 1940); Bailey v. Texas Co., 47 F.2d 153 (2d Cir. 1931).
22. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated in an earlier decision: "It
is axiomatic that jurisdiction may not be conferred or waived by the parties and that
courts at every stage of the proceedings may and must examine into its existence."
Hospoder v. United States, 209 F.2d 427, 429 (3d Cit. 1953).
23. See note 7 supra.
24. Di Frischia v.New York Cent. R.R., 279 F.2d 141, 144 (3d Cir. 1960).
25. Price v. Greenway, 167 F.2d 196 (3d Cir. 1948); Klee v. Pittsburgh & W. Va.
Ry., 22 F.R.D. 252 (W.D. Pa. 1958).
26. It is of interest to note that if the dismissal by the trial court had been affirmed,
the plaintiff could have brought the action in Ohio, where the cause of action accrued.

Ohio has a statutory savings provision which tolls the statute of limitations in that state
to permit a party to bring a new action within one year after his earlier action has been
dismissed other than on the merits. Onio REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.19 (Baldwin 1958).
27. See note 7 supra.
1. 48 Stat. 1100, 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. §§ 501, 605 (1958); 62 Stat. 701
(1948), 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1958).

